1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA * * * 6 7 JEFFREY L. DRYDEN, 8 Plaintiff, Case No. 2:15-CV-00094-KJD-VCF 9 **ORDER** v. 10 PHILIP BURNS, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 14 Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (#8) Plaintiff's first 15 amended complaint. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand (#12) and Motion for Payment of Costs 16 and Fees (#13). Defendants filed a response in opposition (#16). 17 I. Background 18 Jeffrey Dryden, a pro se plaintiff, was employed as a part-time student worker at 19 UNLV's Student Recreation and Wellness Center (#8; #1, Ex. A). Plaintiff contends that 20 Defendants' actions led to his termination. Id. In an amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges (1) age 21 discrimination, (2) religious discrimination, (3) slander per se, (4) negligence, and (5) intentional 22 infliction of emotional distress (#1, Ex. A). Defendants removed the case from the Eighth 23 Judicial District Court of Nevada (#1). The parties then filed the present motions. 24 II. Analysis 25 A. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Remand 26 Defendants assert that Plaintiff's allegations are merely a recital of his respective causes

of action. Defendants also assert that Plaintiff's claims lack factual support and move to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint. Plaintiff contends that Defendants' motion to dismiss should be denied because his amended complaint did not assert a federal claim, and as such, the case should be remanded to state court.

Here, Plaintiff never filed a formal response to Defendants' motion to dismiss. However, the Court has an obligation to construe the pleadings of a *pro se* litigant liberally. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). The Court construes Plaintiff's motion to remand as a partial response to Defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff does not contest dismissal of the alleged federal claims and, in fact, rejects Defendants' assertion that a federal action based on Title VII and the ADEA appears in his amended complaint (#12, p. 9-10). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's federal claims without prejudice.

The remaining claims of (1) age and religious discrimination in violation of NRS 613.330, (2) slander per se, (3) negligence, and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress rest upon state law. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's pendent claims; however, a court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction once all claims over which it has original jurisdiction have been dismissed. See 28 U.S.C § 1367(a), (c). Moreover, "[w]here doubt regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court." Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendants' request for judicial notice of EEOC documents to aid in the interpretation of Plaintiff's amended complaint highlights the existence of doubt as to the propriety of removal based on federal question jurisdiction (#8, p. 8-9). Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and remands the remaining claims to state court.

B. Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs

Plaintiff also moves for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants improperly removed the case from state court and, as a consequence, Plaintiff should be awarded fees. "Absent unusual circumstances, courts may

award attorney's feesonly where the moving pa	arty lacked an objectively reasonable basis for
seeking removal." Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 140-141 (2005). Here, an	
award of fees is not warranted. Plaintiff failed to allege whether the age and religious	
discrimination claims in his amended complaint ar	rose under state or federal law. Additionally,
Plaintiff's inclusion of the EEOC's 'right to sue le	tter' (#1, Ex. A at ¶ 17) in the jurisdictional
statement of his amended complaint created a colorable ambiguity. Accordingly, the Court	
denies Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees.	
III. Conclusion	
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDEREI	that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (#8)
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is GRANTE	D IN PART as to Plaintiff's federal claims,
and DENIED IN PART as to Plaintiffs' claims arising under state law;	
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (#12) is GRANTED;	
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs	
(#13) is DENIED .	
DATED this <u>2nd</u> day of July 2015.	
	Kent J. Dawson
	United States District Judge